The debate over free will is encumbered by the old ideas that surround it. Determinism of the Newtonian sort (the billiard ball theory) stands on the obsolete notion that if it were possible to measure the velocity and direction of all particles, an observer could predict the outcomes of all future interactions, and predict all future events. Chaos theory shows that these measurements quickly seek out infinite degrees of precision, and therefore are, even theoretically, impossible to make, making prediction also impossible. Accordingly, the future is not determined by the present. Randomness emerges across time, even though immediate events are determined through causality.
The mistake that Einstein made was the mistake that the quantum theorists were making: to think that the behavior of quantum particles, which were being described as random, would in fact be random. Einstein could not believe that anything could happen without causality, while the Boor and others asserted the opposite. But why should we not postulate that at the infinitesimal scale of strings, quarks, etc., that causality still operates, but simply beyond our ability to measure? The fact that we can only measure probabilistic behaviors, and not the behavior of particles, is not a comment on nature, it is a comment on our relationship to it. We just don't have the tools to read causality at that scale. Perhaps, as in the Newtonian model, randomness occurs as an emergent property of a deterministic system. But in quantum physics the time scales are so small that there is no meaning to the word "causality".
Let us also remember that no one has postulated a true causal linkage between the uncertainty of quantum mechanics and the manner in which "free will" is produced. "Free will" is a psychological condition, and what is the relationship of this to subatomic particles? Without this link, quantum mechanics is merely a metaphor, or at best proof that determinism isn't necessary.
Thus "free will" lives in the margin of uncertainty between randomness and determinism. When we use these dichotomies, we defeat our efforts to understand. Determinism, causality, and free will, are invented categories which give us a game-board on which to play, but do not actually give us new power to live in accord with what we are and do what we want to do.
For me the greatest challenge in the "free will" debate is the paradox involved. If you are a student of evolution and the life sciences, you might find plenty of cause to believe we do not have free will. We are determined by our biology. But we need to overcome the connotation of "determined" in this case. Our precise thoughts and choices are not predictable, but our tendencies (like the mass properties atoms and quarks) are. Take enough humans together, and we can be expected to eat, poop, seek out sex, give care, talk, scheme, plan, act. We are intrinsically biological, and each of us takes a form predicted by the billions of years that life has flourished on this planet. But that biology gives us a sense of self, and relationships with other selves. In fact, the "self" we possess is a direct product of our relationships — another way that determinism is woven into who and what we are — and yet at that scale, on the scale of relationships, we insist on freedom of action and self determination.
It is foolish to deny our biology, and yet the freedom we covet is real, in the realm in which it operates. The problem is that we treat "free will" as a thing to be owned or not. But let's perform one or two thought experiments. Do you have free will to choose to be another person? Could you choose the body of a mouse, or a tree, or choose to operate as a physical law of the universe? The fact that there is only one body in which you exist, and can exist, and that you will cease to exist when that body dies, determines important properties of your existence. You are a property of the physical universe. That does not mean you are not free within your realm of consciousness. It's a paradox. Pay attention, get accustomed. Breath it.
The distinction between "being" and "doing" is likewise a distraction. While to say "I am gay" or "I am a poor writer" is a box to die in, "being" need not be a static state. From moment to moment I am changing what I am, depending upon the energy I have and the interactions I am engaged in. But being true to myself has always been important to me. I am not trying to be a particular thing, I am trying to be honest and without disguise — I am myself to the extent I am not coerced to express that I am something else (which is the root question of "free will"). "Being" is not adhering to a definition, it is standing in coherence with the internal processes of the body and mind.
Thus "doing" emerges from "being", not as a contradiction, but as a natural property. I feel and live in the internal experience of my body, but everyone else, and everything else, experiences me as what I do, so if I am watching and listening to the effects I have on the people and the world around me, I am learning whether what I am, whether what I value, is expressed in what I do, whether the dynamic, learning, growing, changing self that I am has the impact in the world that I would like it to have, through what I do.
Like the concept of "consciousness", "free will" is a problem of its own making. Without the framing, without the definitions, the problem would not incarnate. They are philosophical problems derived from circular definitions which collapse when we understand them as expressions of a philosophical tradition. They are interesting questions, but I prefer the functionality of paradox over the illusion of certainty.
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